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Abstract 
This paper proposes using both formal and structured 
informal arguments to show that an eventual realized 
system can satisfy its security requirements. These 
arguments, called 'satisfaction arguments', consist of two 
parts: a formal argument based upon claims about 
domain properties, and a set of informal arguments that 
justify the claims. Building on our earlier work on trust 
assumptions and security requirements, we show how 
using satisfaction arguments assists in clarifying how a 
system satisfies its security requirements, in the process 
identifying those properties of domains that are critical to 
the requirements. 
1. Introduction 
Like all requirements, security requirements benefit 
from early understanding of their completeness and 
impact on a system, and from validation that the system 
can respect the requirements. In previous work [16], we 
(and others – e.g. [13]) have argued that security 
requirements may usefully be described as constraints on 
the functions of a system, converting them from quality 
requirements to functional requirements. We have 
proposed that one begins by eliciting security goals for 
assets that are implicated in the system. Next, for each 
function of the system, the analyst determines which 
assets are involved in that function. The analyst then 
determines the security requirement(s) to apply to that 
function in order to satisfy the goal(s). 
Key validation steps for such a process are the abilities 
to show that 1) the proposed security goals adequately 
express what the stakeholders need, 2) the proposed 
security requirements adequately satisfy the goals, and 3) 
the system can satisfy the security requirements.  
The contribution of this paper is the use of structured 
informal and formal argumentation for the third validation 
step: to convince a reader that a system can satisfy the 
security requirements laid upon it. The paper proposes a 
two-part argument structure for security requirement 
satisfaction arguments. The first part is a formal argument 
to prove a system can satisfy its security requirements, 
using claims about system behavior, assuming that these 
claims are true. The second part consists of structured 
informal arguments to support the claims (and the 
assumptions behind the claims) made when constructing 
the formal argument. Building on our earlier work on trust 
assumptions [8] and security requirements, we show how 
two-step satisfaction arguments assist with determining 
security-relevant domain properties, and how inconsistent 
and implausible assumptions about them affect the 
security of a system. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we 
elaborate on the motivation for our work, drawing upon 
related contributions from the areas of design rationale, 
safety cases, and domain analysis. Section 3 summarizes 
our approach to problem analysis and introduces the two 
arguments upon which we base the work presented in this 
paper. Section 4 shows how these arguments are used to 
construct satisfaction arguments when reasoning from 
security constraints to problem context diagrams. Section 
5 presents a discussion and evaluation. Finally, Section 6 
concludes and discusses directions for future work. 
2. Motivation and Background 
Our work is related to, and builds upon, research on 
design rationale and argument capture, on safety 
requirements analysis, and more generally on ideas behind 
problem domain analysis [10, 25].  
2.1 Design rationale and argument capture 
Design rationale is principally concerned with 
capturing how one arrived at a decision, alternate 
decisions, or the parameters that went into making the 
decision [15]. For example, Buckingham Shum [3] 
focuses on how rationale (argument) is visualized, 
especially in collaborative environments. Potts and Bruns 
[21], and later Burge and Brown [4] discuss capturing 
how decisions were made, which decisions were rejected, 
and the reasons behind these actions. Mylopoulos et al 
[18] present a way to represent formally knowledge that 
was captured in some way, without focusing on the 
outcome of any decisions. Ramesh and Dhar [22] describe 
a system for “capturing history in the upstream part of the 
life cycle.” Fischer et al [7] suggest that the explicit 
process of argumentation can itself feed into and benefit 
design. Finkelstein and Fuks [6] suggest that the 
development of specifications by multiple stakeholders, 
who hold disparate views, may be achieved through an 
explicit dialogue that captures speech acts, such as 
assertions, questions, denials, challenges, etc. The 
representation of the dialogue is then a rationale for the 
specifications constructed. The common element in all of 
the above work is the capture over time of the thoughts 
and reasons behind decisions. Whether the decisions 
satisfy the needs is not the primary question. 
When analyzing security requirements, the ultimate 
goal is to convince a reader that the security requirements 
can be satisfied, and that nothing is omitted that could 
result in the requirements not being satisfied. The process 
used is relevant only as it relates to completeness. 
Optimality is not part of the argument. Of course, we are 
not saying that there is no use in having the history that 
lead to the final arguments; this history will certainly be 
useful if the arguments fail to convince, or if the situation 
changes. 
2.2 Safety cases 
Kelly [12] argues that “a safety case should 
communicate a clear, comprehensive and defensible 
argument that a system is acceptably safe to operate in a 
particular context.” He goes on to show the importance of 
the distinction between argument and evidence. An 
argument calls upon appropriate evidence to convince a 
reader that the argument holds. Attwood and Kelly use the 
same principles in [2], where they take the position that 
argument forms a bridge between requirements and 
specification, permitting capture of sufficient information 
to realize rich traceability. 
A similar situation exists with regard to security 
requirements. Combining the two ideas, argument for 
safety cases and using arguments for traceability, we 
paraphrase Kelly’s quote presented above as: “a security 
satisfaction argument should communicate a clear, 
comprehensive and defensible argument that a system is 
secure enough to operate in its context.” 
The techniques proposed by Kelly are not directly 
applicable to security without modification, primarily 
because the techniques are focused around objective 
evidence, component failure, and accident, rather than 
subjective reasoning, subversion, and malicious intent. 
2.3 Problem domain analysis 
Zave and Jackson in [25], and Jackson in [10], argue 
that one should construct a correctness argument for a 
system, where the argument is based on known and 
desired properties of the domains involved in the problem. 
To quote Jackson, “Your [correctness] argument must 
convince yourself and your customer that your proposed 
machine will ensure that the requirement is satisfied in the 
problem domain.” This position is the same as Kelly’s, 
with the proviso that Kelly’s arguments focus equally on 
all domains, with no special emphasis on the machine.  
A similar situation exists with regard to security 
requirements. Two significant distinctions must be made, 
however. The first is that it is very difficult to talk about 
correctness when discussing security. One can convince 
the reader that the proposed system meets the needs, but it 
is far more difficult to prove that the system is correct. 
The distinction between convince and prove (or show) is 
important. It is not possible to prove the negative – that 
violation of security goals do not exist – but one can be 
convincing that sufficient outcomes have been addressed. 
We propose using argumentation to this end: to convince a 
reader that the security requirements can be satisfied. 
3. Argumentation Driven Problem Analysis 
This section summarizes our approach to problem 
analysis, and describes the two kinds of argument. 
3.1. Problem Frames 
We use an approximation of Jackson’s problem frames 
diagrams [10] to represent the system context for a given 
system function. We do not attempt to identify a particular 
problem class, but instead enter phenomena and 
requirements into a system problem diagram. We take this 
approach because we are not attempting to analyze the 
wider development problem. We are instead looking at the 
interaction between domains from a security perspective, 
which requires us to determine which domains can trigger 
or see which phenomena. 
Figure 1 presents an example problem diagram, 
showing, for a simple Human Resources system, the 
domains involved and the phenomena exchanged between 
the domains. As noted above, the diagram is not intended 
to conform to a known problem class, but it does show the 
requirement (the function), the constrained domain(s), the 
inputs, and the phenomena shared between the domains: 
the domains that are involved in the system within which 
the machine operates to realize the necessary function. 
The behavior of the system is specified by the sequencing 
and interplay of phenomena between the domains. 
The notion of claim is central to the work described in 
this paper. To ground the idea of ‘claim’ in Jackson’s 
problem analysis, system requirements are optative 
statements, or statements about what we wish to be true, 
about the behavior of a system, and therefore are claims 
about future system behavior that should be argued (and in 
fact, this is what correctness arguments do). For example, 
the optative statement “the system shall do X” states a 
claim that under the conditions described in the problem, 
the system will do X. The correctness argument 
establishes the validity of this claim. 
Indicative statements, or statements that are 
“objectively true” [10], are used as grounds in a Jackson-
style correctness argument. Grounds, “circumstance[s] on 
which an opinion, inference, argument, statement, or 
claim is founded,”1 are used to justify the claims that the 
optative statements will be true. In the process, one might 
find that the indicative statements must also be argued, 
converting them from grounds in an argument to claims 
made by a sub-argument. The arguments continue 
recursively, with grounds becoming claims, until the 
analyst chooses to terminate the recursion. 
3.2.  Trust Assumptions & Arguments 
Our earlier work extended the problem frames 
approach with trust assumptions [8], which are claims 
about the behavior or the membership of domains 
included in the system, where the claims are made in order 
to satisfy a security requirement. These claims represent 
an analyst’s trust that the domains will be as described. 
Trust assumptions are in the end the analyst’s opinion, and 
therefore assumed to be true. Said another way, trust 
assumptions are unsubstantiated grounds used in security 
satisfaction arguments. Because trust assumptions are not 
argued, they stop the grounds-to-claim recursion. 
The trust assumption work has revealed the need to 
adopt a more structured approach to security satisfaction 
arguments. We wish to satisfy two goals: 1) that given a 
collection of domain properties and trust assumptions 
(accepted as true), one can show that a system is secure, 
and 2) to create a uniform structure for the satisfaction 
                                                 
1 Definition 5C of ‘ground’ from The Oxford English Dictionary, 
Second Edition, 1989 
argument so that the trust assumptions that terminate the 
recursion are made explicit. We satisfy these goals by 
splitting the satisfaction argument into two parts: a formal 
outer argument that is first constructed, and informal 
structured inner arguments that are constructed to support 
the outer argument. 
3.2.1  The Outer Argument 
The formal outer argument uses claims about the 
behavior of the system (interplay of phenomena) to 
demonstrate that the security requirement (the constraint) 
is satisfied. It is expressed using an appropriate logic, 
where the premises are formed from domain behavior 
properties and the conclusion is the satisfaction of the 
security requirement. We use propositional logic in this 
paper, resulting in the outer argument being a proof of the 
form: 
(domain property premises)├─ security requirement 
3.2.2  The Inner Arguments 
The inner argument is a set of informal arguments to 
recursively support the claims used in the outer argument. 
We propose a form inspired by the work of Toulmin [23], 
one of the earliest advocates and developers of a formal 
structure for human reasoning. Toulmin style arguments 
appear to be well suited for our purpose, since they 
facilitate the capture of relationships between domain 
properties (grounds in the formal argument), the trust 
assumptions that eventually support these grounds, and 
reasons why the argument may not be valid.  
Toulmin et al [24] describe arguments as consisting of: 
1. Claims, specifying the end point of the argument, or 
what one wishes to convince the world of. 
2. Grounds, providing any underlying support for the 
argument, such as evidence, facts, common 
knowledge, etc.  
3. Warrants, connecting and establishing relevancy 
between the grounds and the claims. A warrant 
explains how the grounds are related to the claim, not 
the validity of the grounds themselves. 
4. Backing, establishing that the warrants are themselves 
trustworthy. These are, in effect, grounds for 
believing the warrants. 
5. Modal qualifiers, establishing within the context of 
the argument the reliability or strength of the 
connections between warrants, grounds, and claims. 
6. Rebuttals, describing what might invalidate any of the 
grounds, warrants, or backing, thus invalidating the 
support for the claim. 
Toulmin et al summarize the above six items as follows 
[24; pg 27]: “The claims involved in real-life arguments 
are, accordingly, well founded only if sufficient grounds 
of an appropriate and relevant kind can be offered in their 
support. These grounds must be connected to the claims 
by reliable, applicable, warrants, which are capable in 
turn of being justified by appeal to sufficient backing of 
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Figure 1 – HR data retrieval problem 
the relevant kind. And the entire structure of argument put 
together out of these elements must be capable of being 
recognized as having this or that kind and degree of 
certainty or probability as being dependent for its 
reliability on the absence of certain particular 
extraordinary, exceptional, or otherwise rebutting 
circumstances.” Toulmin et al propose a diagram for 
arguments that indicates how the parts fit together. See 
Figure 2. 
Newman and Marshall show in [19] that the ‘pure’ 
Toulmin form suffers because the fundamental recursive 
nature of the argument is obscured. Grounds may need to 
be argued, making them claims. Warrants may need to be 
argued, which is the reason for the existence of the 
backing, but it is not clear how the backing differs from 
grounds in a normal argument. We agree, and extend 
Toulmin arguments to make the recursive properties of 
arguments and the relationships between grounds, 
warrants, and claims explicit, while keeping the basic 
connections between the components that Toulmin 
proposed.  
We propose a simple language to represent the 
structure of these extended Toulmin arguments. This 
language, expressed in the BNF-like LR(1) grammar2 
shown in Figure 3, captures the essence of Toulmin 
arguments while facilitating recursion and sub-arguments. 
Utterances in the language can be seen in Section 4.3. 
We chose a textual language because textual utterances 
are easier to manipulate than tree diagrams, because trees 
are easily generated from the parser’s abstract syntax tree, 
and because a ‘compiler’ can assist in dynamic browsing 
of arguments. Further discussion of the use of the 
language can be found in Section 5.1. 
4. Constructing Satisfaction Arguments 
 
Recall the goal of our work: to construct convincing 
satisfaction arguments that a system can satisfy its 
                                                 
2 This BNF-like form is the input to a YACC-like [11] parser 
generator from Bumblebee Software that generates LR parsers in Java 
and C++. (http://www.bumblebeesoftware.com/)  
security requirements. The use of the word “can” instead 
of the word “will” is important, because we do not know 
if the eventual system implementation will respect the 
specifications levied upon it, nor do we know if the 
system will introduce unintended vulnerabilities. 
To construct security satisfaction arguments, one must 
have security requirements to be satisfied. There are two 
principal steps involved in determining the security 
requirements for a system: enumerating the security goals 
(which assets are to be protected, and why), then 
determining the security requirements (the constraints) to 
apply to the system functions to satisfy the goals. These 
processes are discussed in [16], and are not further 
elaborated in this paper. This paper is about validating the 
security requirements, using the collection of domains 
(including the machine as it will be) to show that the 
system can respect the security requirements.  
A running example is used to illustrate construction of 
security satisfaction arguments. 
4.1.  Explanation of the Example 
A simple human resources application is used in this 
section to illustrate our uses of argumentation. We assume 
one security goal: the data is confidential. One security 
requirement (constraint) has been derived from this goal: 
the data must only be provided to HR staff. Figure 1 
shows the initial problem diagram for this application. 
There are two phenomena of interest: the user’s request 
for personnel information (U!persNumber) and the 
information returned by the request (HR!persData). 
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Figure 2 – Generic Toulmin-form argument 
argument  : optional_assignments claim '.' 
 | argument optional_assignments claim '.' ; 
optional_assignments : LET assignments ';'  
  | // empty ; 
assignments  : assignment  
  | assignments ',' assignment ; 
assignment  : IDENTIFIER '=' atom ; 
claim : optional_grounds proposition optional_rebuttals; 
optional_rebuttals : REBUTTED BY rebuttals_list 
  | // empty ; 
rebuttals_list : rebuttal  
  | rebuttals_list ',' rebuttal ; 
rebuttal : proposition 
 | proposition MITIGATED BY proposition 
 | proposition MITIGATED BY '(' claim ')' ; 
optional_grounds : GIVEN GROUNDS grounds_expr 
    optional_warrant THUS CLAIM 
  | // empty ; 
optional_warrant  : WARRANTED BY grounds_expr 
  | // empty ; 
grounds_expr  : grounds_factor 
  | grounds_expr AND 
    grounds_factor  ; 
grounds_factor : grounds_term 
  | grounds_factor OR  
   grounds_term    ; 
grounds_term  : grounds | NOT grounds ; 
grounds  : proposition | '(' claim ')' ; 
proposition  : IDENTIFIER ':' atom 
  | IDENTIFIER | atom  ; 
atom   : STRING   ; 
Figure 3 – Language Grammar 
4.2. The Outer Argument 
Starting with the HR problem shown in Figure 1, we 
first attempt to construct the outer argument that proves 
the claim: HR data is provided only to HR staff. Recall 
that this argument will take the form  
  (domain property premises) ├─ security requirement 
There are two domains in the problem: the biddable 
domain ‘users’ and the machine (which contains the data). 
To construct the argument, we must first express the 
behavior of the system more formally. To do so, we use a 
notation based on the causal logic described in [17]. In 
this logic, the behavior of the domains in Figure 1, 
expressed in terms of the phenomena, is: 
U!persNum shall cause M!persData 
A major problem is immediately exposed. Given what 
we see in the behavior description, there is no way to 
connect the system’s behavior to the security requirement, 
as membership of the Users domain is not made apparent. 
No formal argument can be constructed. At this point, we 
have (at least) three design choices: 
1. Introduce some physical restriction, such as a guard, 
to ensure that the membership of the domain ‘users’ 
is restricted to HR staff. Doing so would permit 
construction of the following proof: 
M is defined as User ∈ HR 
D is defined as phenomenon HR!persData 
D → M  (if info is displayed, then user ∈ HR) 
D      (info is displayed)  
M      (therefore user ∈ HR) 
2. Introduce phenomena into the system permitting 
authentication and authorization of a ‘user’. 
3. Introduce a trust assumption (TA) stating that we 
assert that the membership of ‘users’ is limited to HR 
staff, even though no information is available to 
support the assertion. 
We choose option 2, and the resulting problem diagram is 
shown in Figure 4. We now require the user to supply 
some sort of credentials along with the request for 
information. These credentials are passed to some external 
authentication and authorization engine, which answers 
yes or no. If the answer is yes, then the machine responds 
to the user with the data; otherwise, the data is refused. 
The new behavior specification is: 
1. U!(UserId, credentials, Payroll#) shall cause 
PIM!Validate(UserId, HR, credentials) 
2. if isValid(UserId, credentials) 
  PIM!Validate(HR, UserId, credentials) 
    shall cause CS!YES  
else  
  PIM!Validate(HR, UserId, credentials)  
    shall cause CS!NO  
3. CS!YES shall cause PIM!PersonInf(Payroll#) 
4. CS!NO shall cause PIM!NO 
The truth or falsity of the isValid predicate is determined 
by the contents of the Credentials Store.  
We must now construct the satisfaction argument for 
the new ‘Users’ domain. We begin with the outer 
argument, first defining the symbols to be used. These are 
shown in the following table. 
Symbol Derived from (see Figure 4) 
I : Input request U!(UserId, credentials, Payroll#) 
V: Validate Creds PIM!Validate(HR, UserId, credentials) 
Y: ReplyYes CS!YES 
D: DisplayInfo PIM!PersonInf(Payroll#) 
C: CredsAreValid isValid(UserId, credentials) 
M: MemberOfHR Conclusion: user is member of HR 
The following predicate logic premises are derived 
from the behavioral specification. These premises are the 
grounds used in the formal argument and, if necessary, 
will be supported by informal arguments. 
Name Premise Description 
P1 I → V Input of request shall cause validation 
P2 C → M If credentials are valid then user is a 
member of HR 
P3 Y → V&C A Yes happens only if credentials are 
valid and validated 
P4 D → Y Display happens only if the answer 
was Yes 
As the requirement is that we display information only to 
a member of HR, we include D as a premise and M as the 
conclusion. Thus we want to show: 
(P1, P2, P3, P4, D ├─ M).  
A proof is shown in Figure 5. 
4.3. The Inner Arguments 
Each of the rules used in the outer argument should be 
examined critically. We begin with the premises P1, P3, & 
P4. These are probably not controversial, because one can 
say that they are part of the specification of the system to 
be implemented. The arguments thus consist of one trust 
assumption, as shown in the following utterance in our 
argument language: 
let G1 = "system will be correctly implemented"; 
given grounds G1 thus claim S1. 
given grounds G1 thus claim S3. 
given grounds G1 thus claim S4. 
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Figure 4 – New HR staff problem diagram 
Premise P2 is more complex. This premise is making a 
claim about the behavior membership of the domain 
‘Users’ by saying that if a person has valid credentials, 
then that person must be a member of HR. An argument 
for this claim is shown in Figure 6. This argument 
incorporates 3 trust assumptions: G2, G3, and G4. 
The three rebuttals in the argument require some 
treatment. Remember that rebuttals express conditions 
under which the argument does not hold. If the rebuttals 
remain in the argument, they create implicit trust 
assumptions saying that the conditions expressed in the 
rebuttals will not occur, which may be acceptable. 
Alternatively, one could construct an argument against a 
rebuttal. We will do that for R1 in the next section. 
4.4. Removing Rebuttals by Adding Function 
Just as one might be required to modify the problem in 
order to be able to construct the outer argument, at times 
the most straightforward way to remove a rebuttal might 
be to add functionality to a system. The additional 
functionality would permit adding new grounds or 
warrants to mitigate the conditions that permit the rebuttal.  
As an example, consider R1: a dishonest HR member 
sells credentials. One could mitigate this risk by increas-
ing the probability that an unusual use of the employee’s 
credentials would be detected, thus raising the probability 
that the misuse would be detected and leaving the 
employee a very uncomfortable position. To this end, we 
add two functional requirements to the system: 
• All uses of HR credentials are logged 
• Any use of HR credentials from a location outside 
the HR department is immediately signaled by 
email to the HR director. 
These functional requirements would then be used as 
grounds in an argument against the rebuttal R1, shown in 
Figure 7. C2 would then be added as a mitigating 
proposition to the rebuttal in argument 1 (R1: "HR member 
is dishonest" mitigated by C2). Note that C2 might also 
mitigate R2 (a successful social engineering attack) by 
revealing unauthorized uses of credentials. 
                                                 
3 This proof was constructed manually and verified automatically 
with DC Proof, by Dan Christensen. http://www.dcproof.com/ 
5. Discussion and Evaluation 
In this section we discuss some issues arising from our 
work, in order to evaluate our approach. 
5.1. The Logic Used for the Outer Argument 
We have used propositional logic in our example for 
simplicity. As a side effect, we hid implicit assumptions 
that ought to be explicit, e.g. the UserId is the same in I 
and V. For our example to be complete, claims (trust 
assumptions) should have been added to the inner 
argument to cover these assumptions. Using predicate or a 
more powerful logic would have removed this difficulty. 
Use of a more powerful, i.e. more fine-grained, logic in 
the outer argument leads to fewer trust assumptions in the 
inner argument. On the other hand, more powerful logics 
are harder to work with. 
5.2. The Inner Argument Language 
The syntactic and semantic structure of the inner 
argument language facilitates several kinds of analysis. 
Because trust assumptions are defined as unsupported 
grounds, one could easily produce a list of them. One 
could produce a list of arguments supporting a particular 
premise in an outer argument, helping verify plausibility. 
One could negate one or more trust assumptions, seeing 
which outer arguments no longer hold. One could produce 
tree diagrams of the arguments, taking closure into 
account. The naming of grounds, claims, and rebuttals 
facilitates reuse of arguments.  
1 I →  V                (Premise) 
2 C →  M (Premise) 
3 Y →  V & C (Premise) 
4 D →  Y (Premise) 
 5 D (Premise) 
 6 Y (Detach (→ elimination), 4, 5) 
 7 V & C (Detach, 3, 6) 
 8 V (Split (& elimination), 7) 
 9 C (Split, 7) 
 10 M (Detach, 2, 9) 
11 D →  M (Conclusion, 5) 
 
Figure 5 – Proof: the security requirement is satisfied3 
given grounds 
  G2: "Valid credentials are given only to HR members" 
warranted by 
( 
 given grounds 
  G3: "Credentials are given in person" 
 warranted by 
  G4: "Credential administrators are honest & reliable" 
 thus claim 
    C1: "Credential administration is correct" 
) 
thus claim 
 P2: "HR credentials provided --> HR member" 
rebutted by  
 R1: "HR member is dishonest", 
 R2: "social engineering attack succeeds", 
 R3: "person keeps credentials when changing depts" . 
 
Figure 6 – Argument 1: for premise P2 
 
given grounds 
 G5: "uses of HR creds are logged" 
  and 
 G6: "uses of HR creds from outside are emailed" 
warranted by 
 G7: "these actions increase the probability of 
detecting improper use of creds" 
  and 
 G8: "the employee does not want to get caught" 
thus claim 
 C2: "HR members will not sell their credentials". 
Figure 7 – Argument against rebuttal R1 
5.3. Constructing Inner Arguments 
One question that arises is “how does the analyst find 
rebuttals, grounds, and warrants?” Unfortunately, we 
cannot propose a recipe. We suggest a method inspired by 
the how/why questions used in goal-oriented requirements 
engineering methods (e.g. KAOS [14]). Given a claim, the 
analyst asks ‘why is this claim true?’ and ‘what happens if 
it is not true?’ 
The method we propose is for the analyst first to 
choose which claim is being argued, and then use the 
‘why’ question to gather the grounds that are pertinent to 
the claim along with the warrants that connect the grounds 
to the claim. The argument is then constructed. 
The analyst next asks the question “what can prevent 
this claim from being true?” The answers are the initial 
rebuttals. Some of these rebuttals will be challenges of the 
grounds or warrants; these create the need for sub-
arguments where the challenged item is a claim. In other 
cases, the rebuttal will not be addressed, thereby creating 
an implicit trust assumption stating that the event(s) 
described in the rebuttal are not to be considered. A third 
possibility is to add new grounds to the argument that 
remove the conditions assumed by the rebuttal. 
5.4. Problem vs. Solution Space 
A reasonable objection to argumentation as described 
in this paper is that we are designing the system in order 
to determine its requirements. To some extent, this is true; 
the domains included in the system are being more finely 
described iteratively. 
However, we argue that the part of the system being 
constructed is the machine, and we are not designing that. 
By applying an iterative process that interleaves 
requirements and design [20], we are specifying the 
environment (or context) that the machine lives within. 
These specifications include additional domains that need 
to exist (perhaps inside the machine), and additional 
phenomena required to make use of these domains. 
5.5. Goal Hierarchies & Argumentation 
The difference between the implicit argument found in 
a goal hierarchy (e.g. KAOS [14]) and the argumentation 
proposed in this paper is primarily one of expressiveness. 
A goal hierarchy has a ready-made structure (it is an 
‘and/or’ tree) whose validity (or invalidity) is immediately 
apparent. The structure of an argument from domain 
properties to security requirements is more complex. 
Because it depends upon the domains and the behavioral 
specification of the phenomena, it needs an explicitly-
crafted outer argument. Finally, the inner arguments make 
use of grounds that would not normally appear in a goal 
hierarchy, for example the warrants G3, G4, and G8. 
5.6. Security Functional Requirements 
Adding functionality to support security requirements 
creates a traceability problem. This paper provided two 
situations where this sort of functionality was added: 
addition of credential verification to permit the outer 
argument to be constructed, and addition of monitoring 
and logging functionality to support removal of the 
dishonest employee rebuttal. Somehow these functions 
must remain connected with the security requirement they 
support, because the need for these functions could change 
or disappear if the security requirement changes. 
6. Conclusions & Future Work 
We have shown how satisfaction arguments facilitate 
showing that a system can meet its security requirements. 
The structure behind the arguments assists in finding 
system-level vulnerabilities. By first requiring the 
construction of the formal argument based on domain 
properties, one discovers which domain properties are 
critical for security. Constructing the informal argument 
showing that these domain properties can be trusted helps 
point the analyst toward vulnerabilities; the rebuttal is an 
important part of this process. Vulnerabilities found in this 
way are removed either through modification of the 
problem, addition of security functional requirements, or 
through addition of trust assumptions that explain why the 
vulnerability can be discounted. 
One area that we are actively looking at is tool support 
for capturing the arguments. The capabilities discussed in 
Section 5.1 are prime candidates; the approach we are 
considering is ‘compiling’ the abstract syntax tree built by 
the parser, decorating the tree with appropriate semantic 
information and symbol table references. We are also 
looking at a tool constructed around problem context 
diagrams by experimenting with adapting the argument 
capture tool Compendium [1] for describing and 
navigating through IBIS-style arguments [5]. 
Another area of focus is to combine the ideas from this 
paper together with our earlier work on threat descriptions 
[9]. The goal is to present a coherent method to elicit 
security goals through the enumeration of assets and the 
threats that they are subject to, and then to link the 
resulting problem context diagrams together to aid 
consistency checking. 
It seems that there might be a close correspondence 
between the ‘defense in depth’ principle and completing 
different outer arguments that depend on different domain 
properties. We wish to investigate this idea in more detail. 
Finally, we continue to investigate industrial case 
studies in order to test these ideas more thoroughly. 
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